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The Italian security regime has recently experienced an important overhaul 
through the adoption of Law 124/2007 on intelligence agencies and the State 
secret privilege.1 This piece of legislation was enacted after a lengthy 
parliamentary debate and exactly 30 years after Law 801/1977, which regulated 
the field until the implementation of the new law.2 The awareness of the need to 
update the Italian legislation on secret services and intelligence activities had 
risen in recent years, as a consequence of both the changed international context 
(especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States) and some 
well-known judicial investigations concerning the involvement of the Italian 
intelligence apparatus in unlawful activities (such as the extraordinary rendition 
of Milan's radical imam Abu Omar) coordinated by foreign intelligence agencies.3  
The recently enacted law contains several innovative elements. At the same 
time, however, it also shows signs of continuity with the previous legislation. In 
particular, the Italian legislation on intelligence agencies and the State secret 
privilege currently features: a) the increased importance of the President of the 
Council as the head of the intelligence apparatus and the creation of an ad hoc 
security committee within the executive branch; b) the maintenance of a 'double 
track' system with a separation between an external and an internal intelligence 
agency; c) the granting of a special status to the agents operating under the 
aegis of the intelligence agencies, e.g. through functional guarantees against 
judicial investigations; d) the strengthening of the intelligence oversight 
mechanisms, within the executive branch, the legislature and the judiciary – with 
a special role for the Constitutional Court; e) the creation of special procedures 
regulating the assertion of the State secret privilege. 
                                                 
1  For a commentary to Law 124/2007 cfr. TF Giupponi, 'Servizi di informazione e segreto di Stato 
nella legge n. 124/2007' [2009] Forum Quaderni Costituzionali 
<http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0161_giu
pponi.pdf> last accessed 20 May 2010 and F Sidoti, 'The Italian Intelligence Service', in T 
Jäger and A Daun, Geheimdienste in Europa (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 78. 
On the Italian security regime more broadly cf. TF Giupponi, Le dimensioni costituzionali della 
sicurezza (Bonomo, Bologna, 2010). 
2  For an overview of the previous legal regime and for an assessment of some of the reasons in 
favour of an overhaul of the legislation regulating the Italian intelligence agencies cf. VF 
Pisano, 'The Italian Intelligence Establishment: A Time for Reform?' [2002] 21 Penn State Int'l 
L. Rev. 263; M Savino, 'Solo per i tuoi occhi? La riforma del sistema italiano di intelligence', 
[2008] Giornale diritto amministrativo 121. 
3  Cf. M Nino, 'The Abu Omar Case in Italy and the Effects of CIA Extraordinary Renditions in 
Europe on Law Enforcement and Intelligence Activity' [2007] Revue International de Droit 
Pénal 113; TF Giupponi, 'Il conflitto tra governo e procura di Milano nel caso Abu Omar' [2007] 
Quaderni Costituzionali 384. 
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a general introduction to the Italian 
legal framework in the field of intelligence agencies and State secret privilege. To 
achieve this purpose, the analysis will be structured as follows. Section I 
analyzes the constitutional principles which are regarded as the basis for the 
activities of the intelligence agencies and for the existence of a State secret 
privilege. Section II outlines the organization of the Italian intelligence apparatus. 
Section III deals with the role of the judiciary and the special status granted to 
the members of the intelligence agencies. The issue of oversight mechanisms for 
the activities of the intelligence agencies forms the core of Section IV. Sections V 
and VI examine the practical operation of the State secret privilege and the legal 
warrantees set up against its abuse. The paper concludes by providing an outline 
of the well-known Abu Omar case, in particular by underlining the main conclusions 
reached by the Constitutional Court in its recent decision n. 106/2009.  
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE ACTIVITIES  
OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE STATE SECRET PRIVILEGE 
The activity of the intelligence agencies raises several issues of constitutional 
relevance. On the one hand, the functions, the organization and the 
responsibilities of the intelligence agencies are peculiar and quite distinct from 
those of other regular administrative bodies. On the other hand, intelligence 
agencies operate within a constitutional system based on the rule of law and 
must be subject to forms of overview. In contemporary liberal democracies, 
therefore, the basis for the activities of intelligence agencies can neither be found 
in the principle of the 'raison d'Etat' – unlike in the ancient régime – nor in a 
hypothetical 'State of necessity' doctrine empowering the State to employ any 
means in the achievement of its purposes.4 Rather, it is a common opinion among 
Italian constitutional scholars that it is the Constitution,5 as the fundamental law, 
that sets the justification and the limits for the operation of intelligence 
agencies.6  
From an operational view point, the activity of intelligence agencies aims at 
gathering information which is useful for the safeguarding of the independence 
and the integrity of the State externally and for the protection of the State and 
its democratic institutions internally. This is why constitutional scholars usually 
identify the foundations of the activity of intelligence agencies on two constitutional 
provisions (sometimes in combination with other provisions of the 1948 
                                                 
4  Cf. the classical study of F Meinecke, Die idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte 
(1924). For a historical perspective of the role of intelligence agencies cf. C Mosca, 'Profili 
storici sui servizi di informazione e di sicurezza', in C Mosca, S Gambacurta, G Scandone and M 
Valentini (eds.), I servizi di informazione e il segreto di Stato (Giuffré, Milano, 2008). 
5  A translation of the Italian Constitution by C Fusaro is available in English at the International 
Constitutional Law web site <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/it__indx.html> last accessed 20 
May 2010. 
6  Cf. also P Bonetti, 'Aspetti costituzionali del nuovo sistema di informazione per la sicurezza 
della Repubblica' [2008] Diritto e società 251. 
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Constitution):7 Art. 52, which states that "(1) The defence of the fatherland is 
the sacred duty of every citizen. (2) Military service is compulsory within the 
limits and under the terms of the law. The fulfilment of military duties may not 
prejudice a citizen's position as an employee, nor the exercise of his political 
rights. (3) The rules about armed forces must conform to the democratic spirit of 
the Republic"; and Art. 54, affirming that "(1) All citizens have the duty to be 
loyal to the republic and to observe the Constitution and the laws". 
According to several scholars, the activity of the Italian intelligence can be 
based on the duty to be loyal to the Republic enshrined in Art. 54.8 This duty, 
however, would not operate in general for all citizens. Rather it would be a 
specific burden for those public officials vested with a peculiar security function. 
The intelligence activity, then, would be characterized by the purpose of ensuring 
the implementation of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic. Another 
group of constitutional scholars, as an alternative, argues that both Art. 54 and 
Art. 52 must be considered as the basis for the action of the secret services:9 
while the first provision operates with regard to internal security, the latter would 
be the basis for the external action of intelligence agencies. The connection 
between the two provisions would concretize "a duty to defend the Republic and 
its fundamental institutions to ensure the possibility of remaining loyal to the 
values which are represented in it."10 
Other constitutional scholars instead identify a constitutional fiat for 
intelligence agencies in the joint application of Art. 52 and Art. 5 of the 
Constitution, which proclaims that "the Republic, one and indivisible, recognizes 
and promotes local autonomy." In this vein, intelligence agencies are required to 
protect "the security of the State conceived as an independent, national, unified 
and indivisible Republic and as […] a democratic polity – against any violent 
action contrary to the democratic spirit."11 Notwithstanding these different 
interpretations, it appears that Art. 52 is generally regarded as the ground for 
the external activity of the intelligence agencies and for the distinct but related 
activity of military defence. The basis for internal intelligence activity is more 
controversial – not least because in this area the role of intelligence agencies 
partially overlaps with the ordinary function of ensuring public security. 
Nonetheless, the activities of regular police forces and of secret services 
should not be confused: while the former are endowed with a general power of 
prevention of socially harmful events and of a post hoc competence to enforce 
security measures, the latter operate with the purpose of acquiring information 
and intelligence that can be helpful in the managing of national security. Despite 
the fact that today, intelligence agencies are increasingly endowed with operational 
                                                 
7  For an overview of several theories advanced by constitutional scholars in the field of 
intelligence agencies see A Poggi, 'Servizi di informazione e sicurezza', in Digesto discipline 
pubblicistiche, vol. XV (Utet, Torino, 1999) 77. 
8  S Labriola, Le informazioni per la sicurezza dello Stato (Giuffré, Milano, 1978) 46. 
9  A Massera, 'Servizi di informazione e di sicurezza', in Enciclopedia del diritto, vol. XLII (Giuffré, 
Milano, 1990) 396-397. 
10  G Cocco, I servizi di informazione e di sicurezza nell'ordinamento italiano (Cedam, Padova, 
1980) 50. 
11  A Anzon, 'Servizi segreti', in Enciclopedia giuridica, vol. XXVIII, (Treccani, Roma, 1992) 1. 
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duties that require officials of the secret services to engage in practical police-like 
activities, the role of intelligence agencies should be preparatory to the action of 
other security agencies and focused on the gathering of intelligence.12 As such, 
the constitutional basis for their activities should be identified ad hoc, rather than 
in the legal principles that legitimize normal State policing. 
Similar problems of constitutional relevance arise with regard to the legal 
basis of the State secret privilege. In general terms, democratic constitutions 
oppose the tradition of the arcana imperii and proclaim the idea of transparency 
and accountability of powers towards the sovereignty of the people.13 In addition, 
freedom of information, the right to access to court and the independence of the 
judiciary are fundamental principles that the Constitution enshrines. Nonetheless, 
while in the public sphere openness should be the rule and secrecy only the 
exception, a constitutional justification for the existence of a State secret privilege 
can still be identified. At the same time, any rationalization of the existence of a 
State secret needs to be placed in context with the liberal values and democratic 
principles that sustain the constitutional system. 
Constitutional scholars have identified the constitutional interests protected 
by the State secret privilege in the defence of the external and internal security 
of the State. However, whereas most academics agree that Art. 52 of the 
Constitution can be considered as the reference norm for the State secret in its 
external dimension (hence connected with military defence),14 disagreement 
exists with regard to the State secret privilege in its internal dimension. Several 
researchers emphasize the role of Art. 54 and the duty to remain loyal to the 
Republic.15 Others, instead, identify the basis of the privilege in the joint operations 
of Art. 52 and Art. 54, just as previously described with regard to intelligence 
agencies.16 The Constitutional Court has offered a different interpretation by 
identifying a compound constitutional foundation of the State secret.17 
In decision n. 82/1976, the Court recognized that the protection of the State 
secret is consistent with the "interest of the State in its international personality, 
that is, the interest of the State in its territorial integrity, independence and – at 
the extreme – in its survival. An interest that is present and preeminent in all 
constitutional systems, irrespective of the political regime, and that in the [Italian] 
Constitution is enshrined in the emphatic formula of Art. 52." The Court later 
developed and explained this reasoning in its decision n. 86/1977: in this ruling 
the basis of the State secret privilege was detected not only in Art. 52, but also 
in the provisions of Art. 126 of the Constitution (which allows for the dissolution 
of regional councils and the dismissal of the President of the regions for "reasons 
                                                 
12  Cocco (n 10) 71. 
13  For a masterpiece description of the principle of transparency and accountability in liberal 
democratic constitutions cf. N Bobbio, 'La democrazia e il potere invisibile', [1980] Rivista 
italiana scienza politica 181. 
14  A Anzon, 'Segreto di Stato e Costituzione', [1976] Giurisprudenza costituzionale I, 1784; P 
Pisa, Segreto di Stato. Profili penali (Giuffré, Milano, 1977) 213. 
15  S Labriola, 'Segreto di Stato', in Enciclopedia del diritto, vol. XLI (Giuffré, Milano, 1989) 1030. 
16  P Barile, 'Democrazia e segreto', [1987] Quaderni costituzionali 37. 
17  For a commentary to the case law of the Constitutional Court in the field of State secrecy see 
Giupponi (n 1) 6 and the literature cited therein. 
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of national security") and especially in Art. 5 and Art. 1, which states that "(1) 
Italy is a democratic republic based on labour. (2) The sovereignty belongs to the 
people, who exercise it in the forms and limits of the Constitution." 
In the words of the Court, "it is in relation with all these norms that it is 
possible to speak of an internal and external security of the State, of a need to 
protect it against violent actions that contrast the democratic spirit which inspires 
our constitutional structure and the supreme interests valid for all societies 
organized in a State […]. For these reasons the institutional interests [protected 
by the State secret privilege] shall relate to the State conceived as a community 
and never overlap with the interests of the Government and of the political 
parties supporting its activities." In conclusion, on the basis of the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court, a compound constitutional basis exists for a State 
secret privilege. This instrument, however, must be employed to protect national 
security against subversive action, and not to foster the interests of political 
majorities. 
II. THE ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
With regard to the organization of the Italian intelligence apparatus, Law 
124/2007 has confirmed and emphasized the leading role of the President of the 
Council – Italy's Prime Minister. The President of the Council has the exclusive 
"high direction and the general responsibility over the work of intelligence 
agencies, in the interest of the Republic and its democratic institutions."18 To this 
end a special committee – the Department on Security Intelligence (DIS) – has 
been set up within the executive branch.19 The DIS coordinates all intelligence 
activities, functions as a support to the President of the Council and operates as 
a link between the activity of the intelligence agencies and the military, the 
regular police forces and the other public administrations. The DIS elaborates 
strategic analyses, reports and forecasts for the President of the Council.20 
The internal structure of the DIS comprises a Database Office – in charge of 
managing and preserving the intelligence; the Office of the Inspector General – 
in charge of evaluating and controlling the work of the intelligence agencies; and 
a special school for the technical preparation of intelligence personnel. The DIS 
also includes a Central Secrecy Office (UCSE), which coordinates, advises and 
controls the rules concerning the application of the State secret privilege and 
grants authorizations for the disclosure of information regarded as confidential. 
Outside the structure of the DIS, an Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Security 
of the Republic (CISR) is endowed with an advisory function.21 The CISR is not, 
however, involved in enforcement policies and its importance is significantly 
diminished by being convened at the discretion of the President of the Council. 
                                                 
18  Law 124/2007, Art. 1(1)(a). 
19  Id., Art. 4. 
20  On the role of the DIS cf. A Corneli, 'Coordinamento assicurato dal Dipartimento per la sicurezza' 
[2007] 40 Guida al diritto 50. 
21  Law 124/2007, Art. 5. 
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Law 124/2007 has increased the competences of the President of the Council 
by other means also. The President is now competent to nominate and remove 
the officers of the DIS – including the General Director of the DIS, under whose 
guidance the DIS operates – to decide the budget and to adopt regulations 
regarding the organization of intelligence agencies. Art. 43 of the Law, in fact, 
gives to the Chief Executive, with the advice of the CISR, the power to adopt 
regulations "which are necessary for the organization and the functioning of the 
intelligence apparatus": the President of the Council, in particular, can adopt 
decrees, even in derogation from the existing rules establishing the normative 
power of the executive.22  
In addition, the central role of the President of the Council in intelligence 
matters is fostered by the termination of all the direct links that used to connect 
the intelligence agencies to the Ministry of Defence and to the Ministry of 
Interior. Law 801/1977 had, in fact, divided the intelligence apparatus into two 
agencies: the Intelligence Service for Military Security (SISMI) and the Intelligence 
Service for Democratic Security (SISDE). Although the President of the Council 
already enjoyed wide power to direct and coordinate the activities of the two 
intelligence agencies – also via an Executive Committee for Intelligence and 
Security (CESIS) set up within the Presidency of the Council – the Law made the 
two agencies formally dependent on, respectively, the Ministry of Defence and 
the Ministry of Interior. Since this situation had created several problems of 
coordination, though, Law 124/2007 has changed this state of affairs and 
centralized all powers in the Chief Executive.  
The new legislation has replaced the SISMI and the SISDE. However, it has 
maintained the separation between two intelligence agencies: hence, currently, 
the Italian intelligence apparatus comprises an Agency for Internal Security 
(AISI) and an Agency for External Security (AISE). It is the responsibility of the 
AISE to "search and elaborate intelligence which is useful for the defence, the 
integrity and the security of the Republic, also with regard to international 
agreements and the threats generating from abroad"23. The AISE is also involved 
in counter-proliferation activities and in all counter-intelligence operations taking 
place outside the national territory. The task of AISI, instead, is to "search and 
elaborate intelligence which is useful to safeguard […] the internal security of the 
Republic and the democratic institutions against any threat originating from 
subversive activities and criminal or terrorist attacks."24 The AISI has competence 
over all counter-intelligence operations taking place within the national territory. 
From this point of view, Law 124/2007 divides the competence between the 
AISE and the AISI only in the light of the origin of the threat and the territorial 
sphere of operation of the two agencies. While the former acts externally (i.e. 
abroad), the latter acts internally (in Italy).25 The legislation, in fact, prohibits 
the two agencies from operating outside their sphere of competence, unless 
                                                 
22  For a critical comment see A Pace, 'L'apposizione del segreto di Stato nei principi costituzionali 
e nella legge n. 124/2007' [2008] Giurisprudenza costituzionale 4047. 
23  Law 124/2007, Art. 6. 
24  Id., Art. 7. 
25  PL Vigna, 'La nuova disciplina dei servizi di sicurezza', [2007] Legislazione penale 700. 
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expressly authorized to do so by the DIS.26 The 'geographical' criterion utilized by 
Law 124/2007 to separate the competences of the AISE and the AISI, however, 
has also a functional implication: whereas the AISE tackles threats concerning 
the security of the State mainly from a military perspective, the AISI is specialized 
in counter-terrorism and other intelligence activities relating to domestic criminal 
groups.27 
Although all the intelligence activities for national security are entrusted 
exclusively to the AISE and the AISI,28 the recent legal reform has been taking 
care to ensure the coordination of the two agencies with other bodies operating 
in the field of internal and external security. To this end, the DIS operates as a 
hub between the AISE and the headquarters of the Ministry of Defence.29 The 
relationship between the AISI and the ordinary police forces is, however, more 
complex. As mentioned above, today there is de facto an increasing overlap 
between the fields of operation of intelligence agencies and regular police forces 
– mostly in counter-terrorism activities.30 Given this situation, Law 124/2007 
requires the DIS to constantly exchange information between the AISI, the police 
and the other institutions fighting organized crime (such as, e.g., the Strategic 
Counter-Terrorism Committee set up within the Ministry of Interior).31 
In contrast to the previous legislation, Law 124/2007 has designed a special 
selection process for the personnel operating in the two intelligence agencies.32 
Whereas under the previous system most officers were transferred to the 
intelligence agencies from the military and the police forces, today the staff of 
both the AISE and the AISI is hired directly by the DIS, in an open and competitive 
selection procedure. A number of incompatibilities are provided by the law: 
hence neither elected officials (at the national, European, regional and local 
level) nor judges, journalists or priests can work as intelligence officers.33 In this 
way, the law pursues the objective of ensuring the independence of constitutional 
bodies and freedom of information and of religion against undue pressures 
originating from within the intelligence apparatus. 
III. THE ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE RULE OF LAW: 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENTS 
The activities of intelligence agencies should take place within the framework 
of the law. As a number of cases from the past demonstrate, however, on several 
                                                 
26  Law 124/2007, Art. 6(4) and Art. 7(4). 
27  Bonetti (n. 6) 264. 
28  Law 124/2007, Art. 8(1). 
29  Id., Art. 8(2). 
30  Cf. also ML Di Bitonto, 'Raccolta di informazioni e attività di intelligence', in R.E. Kostoris and R. 
Orlandi (eds.), Contrasto al terrorismo interno e internazionale (Giappichelli, Torino, 2005) 253. 
31  Law 124/2007, Art 12. Cfr. also TF Giupponi, 'Servizi di informazione e forze di polizia dopo la 
legge n. 124/2007' (2009) 10 Astrid Rassegna <www.astrid-online.it> last accessed 20 May 2010. 
32  M Valentini, 'Il regime giuridico del personale', in C Mosca, S Gambacurta, G Scandone, M 
Valentini (eds.), I servizi di informazione e il segreto di Stato (Giuffré, Milano, 2008) 149. 
33  Law 124/2007, Art. 21. 
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occasions the secret services acted illicitly and even against national security 
interests. In light of this, Law 124/2007 has introduced a new and detailed 
discipline of the relationship between the intelligence agencies and the judiciary, 
which significantly overhauls what was previously an under-regulated sector. Law 
801/1977, in fact, had only stated that intelligence officers had a duty to report 
criminal behaviours to the head of the intelligence agency, who was then 
required to communicate these to the Office of the Public Prosecutor. The 
President of the Council had, however, the power to delay this communication for 
a limited period of time. 
Law 124/2007, on the contrary, introduced several new provisions, mostly as 
amendments to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). To begin with, Art. 
118-bis CCP34 allows the President of the Council to request from the judiciary, 
for all activities connected with the intelligence security of the Republic, the 
transfer of information and documents related to pending criminal investigations. 
The Public Prosecutor can, however, reject the request of the President of the 
Council, if this might jeopardize its investigations. Moreover, on the basis of Art. 
256-bis CCP,35 the judicial authority can order the attainment of documentary 
materials from the premises where the intelligence agencies are lodged. To this 
end a judicial order of disclosure indicating with the greatest detail possible the 
documents, acts or objects to be disclosed is required. The President of the 
Council, nevertheless, has to produce a specific authorization for the disclosure 
of confidential documents which originated from foreign intelligence agencies. 
With regard to intelligence personnel, Law 124/2007 contains a number of 
specific rules which aim at balancing, on the one hand, the need to protect the 
secrecy of intelligence sources and, on the other, the objectives of a fair and 
effective criminal investigation and trial. Hence, the judicial authority must adopt 
all possible precautions to ensure that, when officers of the intelligence agencies 
are summoned, their privacy can be guaranteed by means of closed-door hearings 
or by video-conference.36 The acts of a criminal investigation concerning an 
intelligence officer must also be archived as confidential. Finally, to avoid the 
disclosure of secret information, interception of communications concerning 
intelligence officers can be utilized in judicial proceedings only when authorized 
by the President of the Council: before authorization by the Chief Executive, such 
information can be used by the judiciary only if necessary to prevent or stop the 
perpetration of a crime.37 
The most significant innovation of Law 124/2007 is the creation of a special – 
but rigidly tailored – functional guarantee to shield intelligence agents from 
judicial investigation.38 With this legal mechanism, the law has attempted to 
                                                 
34  Introduced by Law 124/2007, Art. 14. For a comment see E Mengoni, 'Art. 14 – L. 3.8.2007 n. 
124 – Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto 
di Stato' [2007] Legislazione penale 703. 
35  Introduced by Law 124/2007, Art. 15. For a comment see S Campanella, 'Art. 15 – L. 3.8.2007 
n. 124 – Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto 
di Stato' [2007] Legislazione penale 707. 
36  Law 124/2007, Art. 27 
37  Id., Art. 28 
38  P Pisa, 'Le garanzie funzionali per gli appartenenti ai servizi segreti. Il commento' [2007] Diritto 
penale processuale 1431. 
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balance the competing interests at stake. Although the activities of intelligence 
agencies often take place in the shadow and outside the sphere of the publicity 
characterizing the activity of public powers, the reform has attempted to design a 
very precise and well-delimited framework in which the action of the intelligence 
personnel can be made partially immune from judicial investigation. In other 
words, while the law recognizes the legitimate goals of the agencies (of gathering 
and elaborating intelligence also in breach of the law), it has strived to ensure 
that their unlawful activities be limited to a minimum.39 
Accordingly, Art. 17 of Law 124/2007 provides that those officers of the AISE 
or the AISI who have committed activities which are regarded by the law as acta 
rea cannot be prosecuted if the unlawful acts: a) were committed either in the 
exercise of or because of the institutional tasks assigned to intelligence agencies, 
and were specifically authorized by the President of the Council for the purpose 
of accomplishing a duly documented operation; b) were indispensable for the 
accomplishment of an operation, proportionate to the end and if no alternative 
means existed; c) were the result of an appropriate balancing between the 
private and public interests involved; d) produced only the least possible damage 
to the private interests that were infringed.40 Only if all these conditions occur 
simultaneously, do courts declare either the inadmissibility of the suit against 
intelligence officers or their acquittal (save for the possibility of a referral to the 
Constitutional Court)41. 
To ensure the pre-eminence of the constitutional principles and the absolute 
inviolability of the fundamental rights of the individual,42 however, Law 124/2007 
makes clear that the special functional guarantee delineated above does not 
operate if the actus reus committed by the AISE or AISI officer "is a crime 
threatening or against the life, the physical integrity, the individual personality, 
the personal liberty, the moral freedom, the health, or the safety of one or more 
individuals."43 Equally, the functional guarantee does not cover crimes of attacks 
against the institutions of the State and the regional assemblies, against the 
political rights of the citizens or crimes against the administration of justice.44 No 
justification exists for the crimes of abduction and subtraction of confidential 
national security files, terrorism and conspiracy in an organized criminal 
organization.45 
By the same token, to ensure the freedom of action of political parties and 
trade unions as well as the exercise of the freedom of information, Law 124/2007 
clearly prohibits contra legem activities in the premises of the political parties 
which are represented in the national Parliament, in a regional assembly or a 
                                                 
39  Cf. in a comparative perspective TF Giupponi, 'Stato di diritto e attività di intelligence: gli 
interrogativi del caso Abu Omar' [2006] Quaderni Costituzionali 810. 
40  Law 124/2007, Art. 17(6) 
41  See infra § IV.C 
42  F Marenghi, V Caccamo and E Marzaduri, 'Art. 17, 18, 19 – L. 3.8.2007 n. 124 – Sistema di 
informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto di Stato' [2007] 
Legislazione penale 716. 
43  Law 124/2007, Art 17(2). 
44  Id., Art 17(3). 
45  Id., Art 17(4). 
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regional council, in the premises of trade unions as well as against journalists.46 
It goes without saying, then, that by virtue of the fundamental constitutional 
principles of the separation of powers and the autonomy of the constitutional 
organs, unlawful actions by the intelligence agencies could never be justified if 
they take place in the premises of the House of Deputies or the Senate – Italy's 
Parliament; the Presidency of the Republic; the Constitutional Court; the 
Supreme Council of the Judiciary – i.e. the body that oversees the activity of the 
judiciary; or of any court or tribunal.47 
From the procedural point of view, the authorization to commit a criminal act 
with the possibility to escape criminal sanctions must be expressly allowed by the 
President of the Council:48 only in cases of absolute urgency can the directors of 
the intelligence agencies authorize such behaviour on their own; and in any 
event the President of the Council needs to ratify the authorization within 10 
days. If the four above-mentioned conditions are not met, the President of the 
Council cannot authorize an unlawful action: rather, if the Chief Executive is 
aware of unlawful actions by the intelligence personnel, he must inform the 
judicial authority. From this point of view, therefore, the provisions of Law 124/ 
2007 confirm the trend, already highlighted above, of consolidating the role of 
the President of the Council as the authority holding the power and accountability 
in the field of security intelligence. 
In addition, when intelligence agencies intercept communications, a specific 
authorization also has to be obtained from the Office of the Public Prosecutor, as 
required by Law 155/2005. In this regard, however, there seem to be several 
inconsistencies in the legal framework, as Law 124/2007 does not make reference 
to the need for a judicial authorization with regard to other intelligence activities, 
even if e.g. the Constitution requires that no search and seizure can occur 
without a prior judicial warrant.49 Whether the intervention of the judiciary would 
be possible in a situation where intelligence officers are actually authorized by 
the Chief Executive to act in violation of the criminal code is nonetheless 
debatable. The possibility of instituting a kind of 'national security court'50 – an 
ad hoc and independent judicial body capable of reviewing the compatibility 
between the authorized criminal behaviours and the law – has been proposed by 
some as an option, but there is still disagreement among scholars on this issue.51 
In conclusion, by instituting a functional guarantee for the agents of the 
secret services who have committed unlawful actions under the explicit 
                                                 
46  Id., Art 17(5). 
47  P Bonetti, 'Profili costituzionali delle garanzie funzionali per gli agenti dei Servizi di informazione 
per la sicurezza' [2008] Percorsi costituzionali 45. 
48  Law 124/2007, Art. 18. Cf. R Bricchetti and L Pistorelli, 'Il Premier autorizza condotte criminose' 
[2007] 40 Guida al diritto 65. 
49  See Giupponi (n 1) 24. 
50  For an assessment of the functioning of the national security courts in the US system and for a 
proposal to create one to supervise detention of suspected terrorists see J Goldsmith, 'Long-
Term Detention and a US National Security Court', in B Wittes (ed.), Legislating the War on 
Terror: An Agenda for Reform (Brookings Institution P, Washington DC, 2009) 75. For a 
reasoned critique of such a claim see however S Matheson, Presidential Constitutionalism in 
Perilous Times (Harvard UP, Cambridge, 2009) 157. 
51  See Giupponi (n 39) 812. 
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authorization of the President of the Council, if they were indispensable and 
proportionate to the achievement of the institutional tasks of the agencies, Law 
124/2007 ensures the effectiveness of the intelligence. On the other hand, by 
specifying types of criminal behaviour which can never be authorized ex ante and 
justified ex post, the law guarantees the protection of the inviolable fundamental 
rights of men and the core institutional principles that govern the State. The 
attempt by the legislature to strike the right balance between the competing 
interests should overall be positively appreciated.  
It seems, nonetheless, that alternative venues were available and could have 
perhaps been considered by Parliament in reforming Law 801/1977. Hence, 
among others, scholars have emphasized – from a comparative perspective – 
that, rather than specifying the criminal behaviors of intelligence officers that can 
never be authorized and can never benefit from the functional guarantees before 
a court of law, the Law could have determined a priori those unlawful actions 
(and only those actions) that could be authorized by the Chief Executive.52 
Equally, the possibility of introducing several forms of prior judicial oversight of 
the conformity of the specially authorized operations with the law could have 
been taken into account.53 On account of these, while Law 124/2007 represents 
a step forward, additional reforms on the relationship between the intelligence 
personnel and the judiciary could prove necessary in the future.  
IV. THE OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
Law 124/2007, with the purpose of rationalizing the operations of the AISI 
and the AISE, has set up an innovative legal framework to oversee the activities 
of intelligence agencies.54 In the context of a broader re-organization of the 
administrative and institutional structure of the intelligence agencies, the reform 
has introduced three sets of oversight mechanisms on the activities of the secret 
services: A) internal administrative review; B) external political review; and C) 
external judicial review. Specific attention is then given by the law to the 
mechanism of financial and budgetary control. By introducing a plurality of 
instruments to check the activity of the intelligence agencies, the Law has 
acknowledged that a single oversight mechanism is insufficient in itself to 
restrain the security services and that only the existence of different institutional 
constraints can ensure that intelligence agencies do not violate the rule of law.55 
                                                 
52  For support see P Pisa, 'Servizi segreti e Stato di diritto' [2001] Diritto penale processuale 1457. 
53  For support see Bonetti (n 6). 
54  Cf. in general S Gambacurta, 'Il sistema dei controlli', in C Mosca, S Gambacurta, G Scandone 
and M Valentini (eds.), I servizi di informazione e il segreto di Stato (Giuffré, Milano, 2008) 
343. 
55  A similar conclusion is defended in the Report submitted to the Human Rights Council by the 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism M Scheinin, 'The Role of Intelligence Agencies and their Oversight in 
the Fight Against Terrorism', A/HRC/10/3 of 4 February 2009. On the same vein the Special 
Rapporteur has recently submitted also a 'Compilation of Good Practice on Legal and Institutional 
Frameworks and Measures that Ensure Respect for Human Rights by Intelligence Agencies 
While Countering Terrorism, Including on their Oversight', A/HRC/14/46 of 5 May 2010. 
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A. Internal administrative review 
To ensure the continuous internal review of the activities of the intelligence 
agencies, Art. 4 of Law 124/2007 has introduced within DIS a special Office of 
the Inspector General, which is entrusted with the duty "to control the AISI and 
the AISE, to verify the conformity of the intelligence activity undertaken by the 
agencies with the relevant laws and regulations"56 and to set up special 
investigations on professional misconducts and unlawful behaviours. The Office is 
endowed with a certain degree of autonomy from the administrative structure of 
the DIS in order to ensure the independence and the freedom of action of the 
staff of the Inspector General. Nevertheless, many important competences of the 
Office of the Inspector General cannot be exercised absent prior authorization of 
the President of the Council: and this significantly weakens the power of the 
Office to operate as an effective check on the activity of the intelligence services. 
Hence, authorization by the President of the Council, for example, is required 
for the Office of the Inspector General to open a formal internal investigation, to 
access the confidential databases of the agencies and to request information and 
documents from other administrative bodies outside the intelligence apparatus. 
In addition, according to the law, the review by the Office of the Inspector 
General must never interfere with ongoing intelligence operations. These provisions 
clearly weaken the role of the Office of the Inspector General. The Office, 
however, has a general power to oversee the cost of special operations, hence 
putting some internal pressure on the work of the intelligence agencies. From the 
financial point of view, then, the review of the conformity of the budget of the 
intelligence agencies is assigned to a special division of the Court of Auditors, set 
up within the DIS.57  
B. External political review 
At the political level, a central role in the oversight of intelligence agencies 
has been attributed by Law 124/2007 to a special and newly established 
Parliamentary Committee on the Security of the Republic (COPASIR). The COPASIR 
replaces the Parliamentary Control Committee (COPACO) which had been 
instituted by Law 801/1977. The COPASIR is composed of five members of the 
House of Deputies and of five members of the Senate – i.e. Italy's two chambers 
of Parliament – nominated by the Presidents of the two branches of the 
legislature. The COPASIR ensures the equal representation of both the members 
of the majority party or coalition parties in Parliament and of the opposition. To 
guarantee a meaningful involvement of the minority party and an effective check 
on the activity of the Government, the law requires that the President of the 
COPASIR be chosen among the members of the opposition.58 
The institutional task of the COPASIR is to verify "systematically and 
continuously that the activities of the intelligence agencies comply with the 
                                                 
56  Law 124/2007, Art. 4(3)(i). 
57  Law 124/2007, Art. 29(3)(c). 
58  Id., Art. 30. 
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Constitution and the rule of law, in the exclusive interest of the defence of the 
Republic and its institutions."59 To this end, the Law entrusts to the COPASIR a 
review function and an advisory function, and makes it the addressee of several 
mandatory communications by the Government.60 The COPASIR exercises its 
supervision by organizing hearings, requesting documents, accessing premises 
and controlling the intelligence budget. The summoning of intelligence officers to 
testify in front of the COPASIR requires, however, the prior consent of the 
President of the Council, who can oppose the request for justified reasons. By the 
same token, the attainment by the COPASIR of documents in possession of the 
judicial authority is possible, except for reasons relating to the secrecy of 
investigations.61 
The COPASIR can request documents directly from the intelligence agencies 
and is legally entitled to receive a copy. Nevertheless, DIS can oppose such a 
request, if it could "jeopardize the security of the Republic, the relationship with 
foreign States, the course of ongoing operation or the security of sources of 
information and agents of the secret services."62 If the COPASIR insists on the 
disclosure of these documents by deeming the refusal of DIS unjustified, though, 
a special decision has to be taken by the President of the Council, who can resort 
to the State secret privilege. Art. 31(9) of Law 124/2007, then, makes it clear 
that no refusal to disclose documents can be made to the COPASIR when the 
latter is investigating institutional misconduct by intelligence officers.  
Besides its oversight function, the COPASIR also plays an advisory role63: it 
needs to be consulted before the adoption by the President of the Council of 
regulations concerning the organization of the intelligence apparatus and the 
legal status of the personnel. In addition, the Law requires the COPASIR to 
present an annual report to Parliament "to give information about the activities 
that were carried out and to formulate proposals on the issue of its competence."64 
The COPASIR must, however, at all times inform the Presidents of the two 
chambers of Parliament if, in its oversight function, it identifies any irregularities 
by the intelligence agencies.65 
On the basis of Art. 33 of Law 124/2007, moreover, the COPASIR must be 
informed within 30 days of any special operation by the intelligence services in 
which the authorization to commit an unlawful act has been granted. This duty of 
information to the benefit of the COPASIR is particularly relevant, as it puts the 
Parliamentary control body in a position to evaluate and review the circumstances 
of the special operations and their lawfulness in light of the existing legislation.66 
                                                 
59  Id., Art. 30(2). 
60  Gambacurta (n 50) 371. 
61  Law 124/2007, Art. 31 For a comment see G Campanelli and E Mengoni, 'Art. 31- L. 3.8.2007 
n. 124 – Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto 
di Stato' [2007] Legislazione penale 789. 
62  Law 124/2007, Art. 31(8). 
63  Id., Art. 32. 
64  Id., Art. 35. 
65  Id., Art. 34. 
66  Cfr. G Campanelli, 'Art. 33 – L. 3.8.2007 n. 124 – Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza 
della Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto di Stato' [2007] Legislazione penale 800. 
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Every six months, then, the President of the Council has to submit to the COPASIR 
a report on the activities of the intelligence agencies, including a strategic 
assessment of the threats to national security and the responses planned. The 
general budget of DIS must also be submitted annually to the COPASIR to keep it 
informed on the financial management of the agencies. 
Overall, the recent legal reform has gone in the direction of strengthening the 
role of Parliament (and of the opposition in Parliament) in the oversight of the 
activities of the intelligence agencies. It seems, however, that a number of 
shortcomings still persist even under the new legal framework, and that these 
gaps diminish the capacity of the COPASIR to function as a real countercheck of 
the intelligence apparatus. In particular, the COPASIR is always involved a 
posteriori, i.e. once the secret services have already acted.67 As such, the 
COPASIR cannot prevent any potential unwarranted actions by the intelligence 
agencies before they take place. From this point of view, the oversight role of the 
COPASIR is rather political – following a 'traditional' logic of Parliamentary control 
of the action of the Executive power. 
C. External judicial review 
Like the activity of all public authorities, also that of the intelligence agencies 
is subject to external judicial review.68 In general terms, therefore, ex post 
oversight on the action of the secret services consists of the instruments of the 
ordinary criminal judicial system. We have already seen in the previous section 
that Law 124/2007 has instituted a special functional guarantee for the intelligence 
officers only under a limited number of conditions: criminal behaviour of 
intelligence agents in the exercise of their institutional functions – if the conduct 
was expressly authorized by the President of the Council and did not violate the 
principles of proportionality and of the least restrictive means – is not subject to 
criminal sanctions. Beyond this, intelligence agents are responsible for their 
criminal behaviour. 
In addition, to avoid potential distortions of the above-mentioned functional 
guarantees and to make sure that the legal safeguard set up by the law does not 
become a pretext to avoid any judicial review on the activity of the intelligence 
agencies, Law 124/2007 accords a major role to the Constitutional Court. 
According to Art. 134 of the Italian Constitution, in fact, the Constitutional Court 
shall umpire the "conflicts of attribution between branches of government" that 
arise both, when an institution asserts that its competence has been unlawfully 
exercised by another branch or when an institution asserts that another branch 
has wrongly exercised the competence with which it was rightly endowed.69 For 
this reason, the recent reform charged the Constitutional Court with the duty to 
                                                 
67  Bonetti (n 6) 293. 
68  Cf. in a comparative perspective F Fabbrini, 'Lotta al terrorismo e tutela dei diritti fondamentali: 
la Rivista Italiana di Intelligence' [2010] Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico 328. 
69  On the function of the Constitutional Court in resolving conflict of attributions cf. A Barbera and 
C Fusaro, Corso di diritto pubblico (Il Mulino, Bologna, 2008, 5th ed.) 401. See also T Groppi 
'The Constitutional Court of Italy: Towards a Multilevel System of Constitutional Review?' (2008) 
3 Journal of Comparative Law 100. 
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resolve all the controversies regarding the sphere of application of the functional 
guarantees protecting the intelligence personnel.  
When, in the course of a criminal investigation or during the hearings of a 
criminal trial, an intelligence agent invokes his functional guarantee to escape 
prosecution or conviction – and when the President of the Council confirms 
through a written and motivated statement the applicability of the functional 
guarantee – the Office of the Public Prosecutor or the competent Court can – if 
they believe that the decision of the President of the Council is unwarranted – 
refer the matter to the Constitutional Court.70 The latter is hence called on to rule 
on a conflict of attribution between the judicial authority and the executive 
branch and has to decide whether the decision of the President of the Council to 
confirm the use of the functional guarantees' immunity has infringed the 
constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary. 
By channelling before the Constitutional Court the litigation on the concrete 
application of the functional guarantees set up by the law to protect several 
specific activities carried out by intelligence officers, Law 124/2007 has 
attempted, once again, to balance the conflicting interests of national security 
and the rule of law.71 Because of its institutional role, indeed, the Constitutional 
Court seems in the best position to guarantee that neither the activity of the 
judiciary nor the activity of the intelligence agencies are unreasonably restricted. 
At the same time, however, the recent legal reform has opened up new questions 
concerning the role of the Constitutional Court: is the Court only competent to 
ensure that the procedural steps mandated by the law (assuming the law is 
constitutional) have been complied with or is it endowed with the power to 
review on the merits the decisions of the Chief Executive? 
Given that the choice to authorize intelligence agents to commit criminal 
behaviour for the purpose of national security is clearly entrusted, because of its 
political nature, to the President of the Council, it would seem that the 
Constitutional Court would only be able to scrutinize whether the executive has 
complied with the procedural conditions set by the relevant legislation for 
authorizing the agents of the intelligence service to act illegally. At the same 
time, nonetheless, by being able to review the proportionality of the measures 
and their indispensability (i.e. the absence of other less restrictive means), the 
Constitutional Court could end up reviewing the political merit of the decision, 
partially overstepping the functions of the President of the Council (as well as of 
the COPASIR). De facto, in the end, only the legal practice will tell which role will 
the Constitutional Court be willing to exercise. 
                                                 
70  Law 124/2007, Art. 19. 
71  On the balancing function of the Constitutional Court see A Morrone, 'Bilanciamento (Giustizia 
Costituzionale)', Enciclopedia del Diritto, Ann. II.2 (Giuffré, Milano, 2008) 185. For a reasoned 
critique of the risks inherent in the balancing exercise in the field of national security see 
however M Scheinin, 'Terrorism and the Pull of "Balancing" in the Name of Security', in M. 
Scheinin (ed.), Law and Security – Facing the Dilemma (EUI Working Paper Law No. 11, Florence, 
2009) 55. 
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V. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE STATE SECRET PRIVILEGE  
AND OF THE OTHER 'CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION' 
Law 124/2007 has also reformed the legal framework of the State secret 
privilege.72 From an institutional view point, the law has maintained the central 
role of the President of the Council.73 The Chief Executive is in fact the only 
person empowered to order the classification of a piece of information as a State 
secret and to assert the privilege against other institutions. Under the new legal 
framework, however, the DIS is competent to ensure the enforcement of the 
orders of the President of the Council and to guarantee, at the administrative 
level, the handling of State secrets. To this end, a special division – the Central 
Secrecy Office (UCSE) – has been set up within the DIS.74 The UCSE has both 
advisory and control functions, it coordinates the intelligence databases and 
classifies secret information; in addition, it grants (and revokes) special 'security 
clearances' by which individuals are authorized to access classified information. 
Law 124/2007 has in fact introduced a clearer distinction between information 
that is subject to a State secret stricto sensu and 'confidential information'– 
requiring tout court the secrecy of the former while allowing, albeit within limits, 
the disclosure of the latter.75 According to Art. 39, 'secret information' stricto 
sensu consists in "the documents, the acts, the activities, the things, the places 
covered by the State secret" knowledge or circulation of which can damage "the 
integrity of the Republic, even in relation with international agreements, the 
defence of the institutions established by the Constitution, the independence of 
the State vis à vis other States and in its relationship with them and the 
preparation and military defence of the State."76 Only those authorities entrusted 
with specific institutional functions relating to the secret information de quibus 
can be given knowledge about them.77 
A Prime Ministerial decree of 200878 further specified the types of information 
that can be classified as 'secret information'. Among the examples listed in the 
regulation are information relating to the protection of popular sovereignty and 
the economic interest of the State; information identifying the location of the 
military bases; and information concerning plans of subversion. Moreover, the 
decree includes in the possible area of application of the State secret privilege all 
information on the structure, the organization, the competencies and the 
activities of the DIS and the intelligence agencies, including their relationships 
                                                 
72  Cf. in general A Morrone, 'Il nomos del segreto di Stato, tra politica e Costituzione', [2008] 
Forum Quaderni Costituzionali <http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/ 
documenti_forum/paper/0164_morrone.pdf> last accessed 2 June 2010; G Scandone, 'Il segreto 
di Stato nella legge di riforma', in C Mosca, S Gambacurta, G Scandone and M Valentini (eds.), 
I servizi di informazione e il segreto di Stato (Giuffré, Milano, 2008) 481. 
73  G Salerno, 'Il segreto di Stato tra conferme e novità' [2008] Percorsi costituzionali 66. 
74  Law 124/2007, Art. 9. 
75  S Gambacurta, 'I controlli, il segreto di Stato e le classifiche di segretezza', in C Mosca, S 
Gambacurta, G Scandone and M Valentini (eds.), I servizi di informazione e il segreto di Stato 
(Giuffré, Milano, 2008) 735-737. 
76  Law 124/2007, Art. 39(1). 
77  Id., Art. 39(2). 
78  Decree of the President of the Council of 8 April 2008. 
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with foreign services. Despite the attempt by the legislation to adopt a more 
analytical approach to the information that can be protected by the State secret 
privilege, therefore, it seems that the range of information that is potentially 
'secret' remains wide.79 
With regard to 'confidential information', instead, Law 124/2007 singles out 
four categories of information that are subject to different disclosure policies:80 
depending on its content, information can be 'top-secret', 'secret', 'top-privy' and 
'privy'.81 The classification is set up directly by the intelligence, on the basis of 
the risk deriving from the potential spread of the information. Contrary to 'secret 
information' stricto sensu, 'confidential information' can be disclosed to those 
people who have a need to access it for institutional purposes. A special 'security 
clearance' needs to be granted by the UCSE for this purpose (except to access to 
the 'privy information'); the security clearance, though, has a different validity 
depending on the type of information the access of which is requested: it lasts 
ten years with regard to 'top-privy' or 'secret' information, but only five years for 
'top-secret' information.82 
Although the Constitutional Court has acknowledged in its judgment n. 295/ 
2002 that the interests protected by both, 'secret information' and 'confidential 
information' are homogenous and largely overlapping,83 the distinction between 
the two introduced by Law 124/2007 has important consequences. To begin with, 
from the operational point of view, information can be classified as State secret 
stricto sensu only by the President of the Council.84 Vice-versa, 'confidential 
information' is directly classified (in one of the four above-mentioned categories) 
by the authority which has drafted the document, attained the information and is 
responsible for it.85 The President of the Council, with the support of the DIS and 
the UCSE, only oversees the general respect for the applicable laws and 
regulations.  
In addition, 'secret information' stricto sensu and 'confidential information' 
differ with regard to the length of the duration of its classification as such. The 
classification as State secret ordinarily lasts for 15 years, but the President of the 
Council can renew it for another 15 years.86 After a maximum of 30 years, "all 
those who have an interest can request the President of the Council to grant 
access to the information, the documents, the acts, the activities, the objects 
and the places which are covered by the State secret."87 At any time, however, 
                                                 
79  Cf. critically Pace (n 22) 4042. 
80  Cf. G Salvi, 'Confermate le classifiche di riservatezza' [2007] 40 Guida al diritto 77. 
81  Law 124/2007, Art. 42. G Campanelli and F. Alemi, 'Art. 42 – L. 3.8.2007 n. 124 – Sistema di 
informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto di Stato' [2007] 
Legislazione penale 855. 
82  Law 124/2007, Art. 9(3). 
83  Cf. for a commentary on the decision P Pisa and L Scopinaro, 'Segreto di Stato e notizie riservate: 
un'interpretazione costituzionalmente corretta in attesa della riforma del codice penale' [2002] 
Giurisprudenza costituzionale 2130. 
84  Law 124/2007, Art. 39(4). Cf. Salerno (n 73) 66. 
85  Law 124/2007, Art. 42(4). 
86  Cf. Bonetti (n 6) 289. 
87  Law 124/2007, Art. 39(7). See also S Gambacurta, 'Il diritto di accesso', in C Mosca, S 
Gambacurta, G Scandone and M Valentini (eds.), I servizi di informazione e il segreto di Stato 
(Giuffré, Milano, 2008) 698. 
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the President of the Council can withdraw the secrecy and declassify all the 
information – except when this concerns foreign agents; in such case a special 
agreement with the foreign authorities is required.88 On the contrary, 
'confidential information' remains classified for a maximum of ten years and after 
five years they are automatically downgraded to a lower level of 'secrecy' (e.g. 
from 'top-secret' to 'secret'), except when the President of the Council provides 
otherwise with a motivated act.89  
In sum, by establishing a different legal discipline for 'secret information' and 
'confidential information', Law 124/2007 has attempted to vary the degree of 
protection on the basis of the qualitative relevance of the information. Whereas 
the State secret stricto sensu protects 'the supreme and essential interests of the 
State', connected to the integrity of the Republic, the defence of the institutions 
established by the Constitution, the independence of the State vis à vis other 
States and in its relationship with them and the military capacity of the State, 
'confidential information' is directed at safeguarding those 'fundamental interests 
of the Republic', for which the intelligence agencies deem appropriate such form 
of classification and access restricted only to those persons institutionally involved 
or 'cleared' by the UCSE. 
VI. THE STATE SECRET PRIVILEGE AND THE RULE OF LAW:  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY  
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL 
In reforming the legal framework of the State secret privilege, Law 124/2007 
has attempted to strike a more reasonable balance between the needs of 
national security and the rule of law than that of the previous legal regime.90 The 
rules on the State secret privilege contained in Law 801/1977 were indeed mostly 
ambiguous and de facto integrated by several 'hidden' executive regulations. As 
mentioned in the previous section, on the contrary, within the current legal 
regime the Law clearly defines what information can be classified as State 
secrets and expressly identifies in the President of the Council the only authority 
who can order the classification of a piece of information as a 'State secret' 
stricto sensu. With this choice Law 124/2007 has strengthened – also with 
regard to the State secret – the position of the President of the Council, but it 
has also clearly identified the accountable authority.91  
Although the DIS and the intelligence agencies can advise the President of 
the Council, the decision to classify a piece of information as a State secret is an 
autonomous political choice of the Chief Executive, the effect of which is the 
beginning of the 15-year period in which the information remains totally 
inaccessible. It has to be borne in mind, nonetheless, that according to Art. 202 
                                                 
88  Law 124/2007, Art. 39(10). Cf. G Salvi, 'Durata massima di quindici anni' [2007] 40 Guida al 
diritto 75-76. 
89  Law 124/2007, Art. 42(5). 
90  Cf. A Natalini, 'Arcana imperii e tutela penale del segreto di Stato: le "nuove" frontiere del 
sindacato di legittimità sugli atti di apposizione' [2003] Giurisprudenza italiana 1229. 
91  Giupponi (n 1) 38. 
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CCP92 the President of the Council can also decide to seal the secrecy of a piece 
of information, when access to the latter is requested by a judicial authority – 
and in this case, the dies a quo for the 15-years validity of the secrecy is 
regarded as starting from the very day in which the Chief Executive has asserted 
the privilege not to disclose the information. To avoid any arbitrary use of this 
executive power, however, Law 124/2007 has established several legal checks 
regulating the relationship between the executive and the judiciary.93 
In particular, when in the course of a criminal investigation the accused 
person or any other party to the lawsuit invokes the State secret privilege, the 
judiciary (including the Office of the Public Prosecutor) can raise a formal 'appeal' 
to the President of the Council, asking him to confirm or deny the existence of a 
State secret over the requested information.94 If within 30 days the President of 
the Council does not reply, the judicial authority can attain all the information as 
regular evidence.95 If, instead, the President of the Council confirms the existence 
of a State secret classifying the requested information, the judge of the proceedings 
shall either dismiss the lawsuit or continue it without considering as valid evidence 
the information protected by the State secret.96 Nonetheless, if the judicial 
authority is not convinced by the decision of the Chief Executive, it can start 
proceedings for a conflict of allocation of powers before the Constitutional Court. 
Otherwise, in addition to these procedural guarantees against potential abuses 
of the State secret by the executive power, Art. 39(11) of Law 124/2007 also 
sets out several substantive guarantees aimed at forbidding the invocation of the 
State secret privilege in some sensitive criminal investigations. Hence, no State 
secret can be asserted by the President of the Council to prevent a judicial 
investigation concerning acts of terrorism, attacks to the constitutional order and 
the crimes of havoc and conspiracy in mafia organizations. Equally, on the basis 
of Art. 204(1bis) CCP97 no State secret privilege can be invoked to hamper 
investigations on unlawful conduct by intelligence officers carried out in violation 
of the ad hoc rules establishing and limiting the room of application of the 
functional guarantees. Thanks to these provisions, Law 124/2007 ensures that 
the State secret privilege will not be used to jeopardize those constitutional 
interests for the protection of which it has been created. 
As a consequence, whenever in the midst of a criminal investigation the 
judicial authority encounters acta rea which fall into the above-mentioned list of 
criminal conducts for which no State secret can be opposed, it can disregard the 
classification sealed by the President of the Council and attain all the information 
as evidence for the trial. The judicial authority must however notify its decision 
to the Chief Executive, who can, in reaction, bring a conflict of attribution before 
the Constitutional Court. In the end, therefore, the Constitutional Court can 
                                                 
92  As modified by Law 124/2007, Art 40(1). For a critical view see G Salvi, 'Dubbi sull'opposizione 
del segreto' [2007] 40 Guida al diritto 83. 
93  C Bonzano, 'La nuova tutela penale del segreto di Stato: profili sostanziali e processuali' [2008] 
Diritto penale processuale 26. 
94  Law 124/2007, Art. 41(2). 
95  Id., Art. 41(4). 
96  Id., Art. 41(5) and Art. 41(6). 
97  Introduced by Id., Art. 40(3). 
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always be called upon to decide on the application of the State secret privilege, 
with the duty to strike the appropriate balance between the conflicting requests 
of the executive and the judiciary.  
As provided by Art. 41(7) of Law 124/2007, "when the Constitutional Court 
resolves the conflicts of attribution by denying the admissibility of the assertion 
of the State secret, the President of the Council cannot invoke it anymore against 
the judiciary; when, on the contrary, the Constitutional Court resolves the conflicts 
of attribution by recognizing the admissibility of the assertion of the State secret, 
the judicial authority cannot attain and make use, either directly or indirectly, of 
the acts and documents sealed by a State secret". As such, the recent legal 
reform has attempted to balance the conflicting interests at stake by making the 
Constitutional Court the final arbiter of the inevitable tensions raising between 
the judiciary (which pursues its institutional task of prosecuting crimes) and the 
executive (which has a constitutional duty to ensure national security).98 
On the other hand, as highlighted in Section IV, the task entrusted to the 
Constitutional Court is not always easy and could lead the Court down a slippery 
path. The Constitutional Court seems to be aware of this challenge, and, as a 
consequence, has, in general, adopted a cautious stand – acknowledging that the 
decision to classify information as a State secret is the expression of a largely 
discretionary power of the executive aiming at the protection of the supreme 
interests of the State. Equally, in its ruling n. 110/1998 (when, of course, Law 
124/2007 was not yet in force) the Court has clarified that its judicial scrutiny 
will not extend to a review on the merits of the balancing choices made by the 
political branches. Rather, under the legal regime of Law 801/1977, the Court 
has emphasized that Parliament should have a greater role in the oversight of 
the assertion of the State Secret privilege.99  
Taking seriously this invitation, Law 124/2007 has strengthened the political 
review mechanism by increasing the involvement of the COPASIR in this field. 
The COPASIR must in fact be informed by the President of the Council of any 
decision to classify a piece of information as a State secret (or to renew this 
classification after 15 years) as well as of any decision to invoke the State secret 
privilege against a judicial request for the disclosure of information. If the 
COPASIR considers the decision unwarranted, it can submit a report to the 
Chambers of Parliament, thereby giving rise to a political debate on the legitimacy 
of the measure. Breaking with the previous legal regime, then, Law 124/2007 
denies any possibility of invoking a State secret privilege against an investigation 
by the COPASIR, when there is an unanimous request to be granted access to 
the information.100 
Nevertheless, the political oversight mechanisms of the concrete application 
of the State secret privilege still remain weaker than the judicial ones. De facto, 
                                                 
98  Cf. N Triggiani, 'Art. 40 – L. 3.8.2007 n. 124 – Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della 
Repubblica e nuova disciplina del segreto di Stato' [2007] Legislazione penale 840-841; G 
Salvi, 'Alla Consulta il ruolo di ultimo garante' [2007] 40 Guida al diritto 85. 
99  On the role of Parliament in overseeing the application of the State secret privilege see R Borrello, 
Segreti pubblici e poteri giudiziari delle commissioni d'inchiesta: profili costituzionalistici (Giuffré, 
Milano, 2003). 
100  Law 124/2007, Art. 31(9). 
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by specifying the objective interests that can legitimize the privilege of the 
State secret; by clarifying the authorities, the procedures, the responsibilities 
and the limits of the employment of the State secret privilege, as well as by 
stating that the State secret privilege can never be utilized to prevent the 
Constitutional Court from acquiring all the information it requests,101 Law 124/ 
2007 has made the Constitutional Court the leading oversight institution. All 
these factors push the Court to operate as a true judge of the lawfulness of the 
employment of the State secret privilege and not just as an external auditor of 
the respect for the procedures provided by the law. As the Abu Omar case 
demonstrates, however, the Constitutional Court has not proved itself as being 
up to the challenge yet. 
VII. THE ABU OMAR CASE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The Abu Omar judicial saga102 began in 2005, when the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor of Milan, led by Mr. Armando Spataro, opened a formal criminal 
investigation on the secret abduction in Milan and the extraordinary rendition103 
to Egypt of a radical imam, Mr. Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr (alias Abu Omar), by 
agents of the Italian intelligence in cooperation with CIA personnel in Italy. In the 
course of the criminal investigation, the defendants, Mr. Nicolò Pollari and Marco 
Mancini – both officers of the SISMI, invoked a State secret privilege concerning 
the organization of the secret services and the relationship of the Italian agencies 
with foreign agencies, but not the extraordinary rendition of Mr. Abu Omar 
itself. The existence of a State secret privilege was confirmed (though with 
some delay) by the President of the Council Romano Prodi and later also by 
Silvio Berlusconi. 
The decision of the Chief Executive to deny access to all information on the 
organization of the intelligence and on its relationship with the CIA generated a 
                                                 
101  Id., Art. 41(8). 
102  On the Abu Omar case cf. in addition to the literature cited supra in nt 3 J Foot, 'The 
Rendition of Abu Omar' [2007] 15 The London Rev of Books 24; F Messineo, ' "Extraordinary 
Renditions" and State Obligations to Criminalize and Prosecute Torture in the Light of the Abu 
Omar Case in Italy' [2009] 7 J Intl Crim Justice 1023. 
103  For a description of the practice of extraordinary renditions in the war on terror and for its 
critique see M Satterthwaite, 'Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of 
Law' [2006] 75 Geo Wash L Rev 1333. The practice of extraordinary rendition has recently 
come under fire by different international institutions. Cf. the Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 'Report on the USA', CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 of 18 December 2006; the Final Report of 
the European Parliament, 'Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation 
and Illegal Detention of Prisoners', Eur. Parl. Doc. A6-0020/2007 of 30 January 2007; and the 
two Reports written by Dick Marty for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 'Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of 
Europe Member States', AS/Jur (2006) 03 of 22 January 2006 and 'Secret Detentions and 
Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States', AS/Jur (2007) 36 
of 7 June 2007. For a comment to the reports of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe cf. also M Hakimi, 'The Council of Europe Addresses CIA Rendition and Detention 
Program' (2006) 101 AJIL 442. 
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cluster of litigations before the Constitutional Court.104 Both the judge of the 
proceedings in Milan and the Office of the Public Prosecutor, in fact, brought a 
conflict of attribution against the Government, asserting the infringement of their 
constitutional prerogatives. The President of the Council, in its turn, started 
proceedings against the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the judge in Milan for 
making use of information subject to the State secret privilege in the criminal 
trial. All the conflicts of attribution were considered prima facie as admissible by 
the Constitutional Court which, after uniting the proceedings, moved to the 
decision on the merits in February 2009. 
The judgment of the Court, n. 106/2009, began with a detailed explanation of 
the facts of the case and with a long reassessment of the precedents of the Court 
in the field of State secrecy. The Court restated its view that the judiciary can 
"not scrutinize the 'an' [if] or the 'quomodo' [how] of the decision of the executive 
to seal an information as a State secret, because the choice on the necessary 
and appropriate means to ensure national security is a political one – belonging 
as such to the executive branch and not to the ordinary judiciary". At the same 
time, however, the Court reaffirmed with confidence its role "in the case of a 
conflict of attribution between powers of the State". The language adopted 
seemed, therefore, to imply a full and unrestrained power of the Constitutional 
Court to scrutinize the action of the executive. 
In the leading part of the decision, however, the Constitutional Court refused 
to review the reasons brought forward by the government to seal as State secret 
the information requested by the ordinary judiciary. In the words of the 
Constitutional Court, in fact, "the judgment on what means are considered as 
most appropriate or simply useful to ensure the security of the State belongs to 
the President of the Council under the control of Parliament". In the opinion of 
the Court, in fact, any such decision would result in a "judgment on the merit of 
the choice to dispose the State secret": and this would not be consistent with the 
role of the Constitutional Court. According to the Court, Law 124/2007 had 
entrusted a specific duty to review the proportionality of the decision taken by 
the Government to the COPASIR, the duty of which was to perform a political 
review of the intelligence apparatus.  
On the basis of this reasoning the Court reached the conclusion that the 
Government could not be blamed for any unlawful behaviour and that, as a 
consequence, the claims of the court and the Office of the Public Prosecutor of 
Milan had to be rejected. After the decision of the Constitutional Court, the 
criminal trial restarted in Milan: the Prosecutors and the judge, Oscar Magi, 
however, did not have the possibility to use the information regarded by the 
executive branch as a State secret. The trial eventually lead to the sentencing of 
26 CIA agents for the crime of abduction and the extraordinary rendition of Mr. 
Abu Omar. Because of the operation of the State secret privilege, however, the 
officers of the Italian agencies were all acquitted as the evidence against them 
could not be utilized by the court.  
                                                 
104  Giupponi (n 3) 384; M Perini, 'Segreto di Stato, avanti con leggerezza: due ordinanze, quattro 
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The outcome of the Abu Omar judicial saga has been regarded as positive by 
some scholars, who have seen in the investigation of a crime of extraordinary 
rendition and in the decision by a court of law to condemn the responsible 
persons for the grave violations of human rights they had committed an important 
victory of the rule of law over the need of national security.105 This view is largely 
to be shared, since overall the Abu Omar judicial saga marks a step forward in 
the re-establishment of the rule of law even in the age of terrorism. Nonetheless 
the fact that the final outcome of the criminal trial in Milan led to the condemnation 
only of US foreign agents (who the US has already made clear it will not 
extradite)106, with the acquittal instead of all the Italian intelligence officers 
involved in the operation, has also given rise to some legitimate criticism.107 
In particular, the decision of the Constitutional Court does not seem entirely 
satisfactory. As has been convincingly argued, the Court itself had made clear 
since the beginning of its judgment that its role extended to the evaluation of the 
conditions justifying the State secret privilege. Logically, however, such an 
evaluation cannot be limited to a procedural review and should include a deeper 
scrutiny of the legitimacy on the merits of the decision to classify a piece of 
information as a State secret.108 For the Court, it is therefore rather inconsistent 
with its own premises to conclude, in the dispositive part of its judgment, that it 
will only limit itself to a sort of external review of compatibility of the decision of 
the Chief Executive with the procedures set by the law and that it will not dwell 
on the reasons that justified the decision taken by the President of the Council. 
Although, for sure, the Constitutional Court should not be entitled to challenge 
the political decision of the Government, still, by giving up the power to review 
the reasons advanced by the executive to classify a piece of information as a 
State secret the Court de facto risks reducing the conflict of attribution to a 
meaningless oversight mechanism. This also seems to contrast with the original 
intent of Law 124/2007 which – inter alia by denying the possibility for the 
Government to invoke a State secret privilege before the Constitutional Court – 
was inspired by the will to make the Court aware of all the evidence necessary to 
make a reasoned and informed decision on the merits. In light of this, in the Abu 
Omar case, the Constitutional Court, by adopting a minimalist approach,109 has 
not exercised an appropriate balancing test of the different constitutional 
interests at stake. 
In the end, by bowing to the autonomous evaluation of the Government and 
of Parliament and by restricting its review to an external oversight of the respect 
                                                 
105  See e.g. D Cole, 'Getting Away With Torture' [2010] 1 The New York Rev of Books 39. 
106  Cf. on this problem P Gaeta, 'Extraordinary renditions e immunità dalla giurisdizione penale 
degli agenti di Stati esteri: il caso Abu Omar' [2006] Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 126. 
107  F Ramacci, 'Segreto di Stato, salus rei publicae e "sbarramento" ai p.m.' [2009] Giurisprudenza 
costituzionale 1015; G Salvi, 'La Corte e il segreto di Stato'[2009] Cassazione Penale 3729. 
108  A Anzon, 'Il segreto di Stato ancora una volta tra Presidente del Consiglio, autorità giudiziaria 
e Corte costituzionale' [2009] Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1020. 
109  On the idea of judicial minimalism cf. C Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on 
the Supreme Court (Harvard UP, Cambridge, 2001). For a critique of the practice of judicial 
self-restraint in counter-terrorism issues cf. however the position defended by F de Londras in F 
de Londras and F Davis, 'Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives 
on Effective Oversight Mechanisms' [2010] 30 OJLS 19. 
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for the procedures provided by the law, the Constitutional Court has embraced a 
sort of political question doctrine.110 Under a similar doctrine, however, the needs 
of national security would always trump the objective to guarantee respect for 
the rule of law through the activity of the courts. It seems therefore that the 
innovative provisions of Law 124/2007, instituting the conflict of attribution as a 
mechanism to restrain the executive power in the area of the State secret 
privilege, are weakened by the Abu Omar jurisprudence – as no substantive 
review of the decision of the Government will be taken by the Constitutional 
Court. 
From this point of view, the Abu Omar judicial saga and the unsatisfactory 
decision of the Constitutional Court, highlight how difficult it is to design 
institutional mechanisms for the oversight of the activities of intelligence agencies 
and of the employment of the State secret privilege. Despite having been 
recently overhauled, the Italian legal framework already displays gaps which 
could be exploited by the intelligence agencies to escape accountability. At the 
same time, however, Law 124/2007 has set up several innovative mechanisms 
that could be used in the future to restrain the executive branch: whether the 
Italian institutions, and especially the Constitutional Court, will be up for this 





 Tommaso F. Giupponi is Professor of 
Constitutional Law, University of Bologna 
Alma Mater Studiorum. 
 Federico Fabbrini is PhD candidate, 





                                                 
110  On the role of the judiciary vis à vis the other branches of government in the age of terrorism 
see F Fabbrini, 'The Role of the Judiciary in Times of Emergency: Judicial Review of Counter-
Terrorism Measures in the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice' 
(2009) 28 Ybk Eur L 664. 
